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Géopolitique de gaz de schiste
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algeriedrs :: Géostratégie, géo-économie, géolocalisation, géopolitique, géosociétologie ... :: Géopolitique, géostratégie , géolocalisation,géosociétologie ... :: Nouvelle donne de la géopolitique mondiale
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Géopolitique de gaz de schiste
par Syfou Jeu 13 Déc - 21:25
Géopolitique de gaz de schiste
Une vidéo explicative des méthodes pour
l'extraction du gaz de schiste
[url]
Gaz de schiste : explications. par nonaugazschiste07[/url]
Gaz de schiste ?
Définition du terme gaz de schiste
Qu'est ce qu'un gaz de schiste ? Ce terme vient de la "mauvaise" traduction de l'anglais shale gas. Shale est un mot anglais, sans traduction française simple. Selon le Dictionnaire de Géologie de Foucault et Raoult, ce terme anglais shale « désigne toute roche sédimentaire litée à grain très fin, en générale argileuse ou marneuse ». On peut comparer cette définition avec les deux définitions du mot "schiste", qui sont les suivantes dans ce même dictionnaire : « (1) au sens large (qu'il vaut mieux éviter), toutes roches susceptible de se débiter en feuillet. Ce terme peut donc désigner aussi bien un schiste métamorphique (angl. schist), qu'une roche présentant un clivage ardoisier (angl. slate) ou bien une pélite (argile) feuilletée (angl. shale)[…] et (2) : roche ayant acquis une schistosité sous l'influence de contraintes tectoniques ».
Dans l'expression « gaz de schiste », le terme "schiste" est donc par définition un terme qu'il est souvent conseillé d'éviter. Cela commence bien ! Ce gaz n'est pas contenu dans des schistes au sens tectono-métamorphique (le sens usuel et conseillé en France), mais dans des argiles et marnes litées, bien sédimentaires. On devrait donc plutôt parler de "gaz de marnes" ou de "gaz de pélites". Mais l'expression « gaz de schiste » est maintenant entrée dans les mœurs, et nous continuerons à l'employer.
Qu'est ce que le gaz de schiste et les autres sources de gaz non conventionnel ?
Ce qu'on appelle « gaz de schiste », c'est du gaz (méthane) encore contenu dans sa roche mère, parce que celle-ci n'est pas (ou très peu) perméable. Ce méthane y est souvent contenu dans des (micro)pores ne communiquant pas entre eux, ou éventuellement adsorbé sur des particules argileuses, d'où l'imperméabilité de la roche. Cette non perméabilité a empêché le méthane (et les autres hydrocarbures) de migrer. La roche mère est donc restée riche en gaz. Elle peut contenir jusqu'à 20 m3 de gaz (aux conditions de surface, 20°C et 1 atm) par mètre-cube de roche en place. C'est donc à la fois une roche mère et une roche magasin. Mais cette imperméabilité empêche son extraction par des moyens classiques comme de simples forages. Des techniques récentes permettent d'extraire une fraction notable de ce gaz, malgré l'imperméabilité de la roche mère/magasin. Les roches mères/magasins de ce gaz de schiste sont classiquement les black shales (en anglais) ou les "argiles et marnes noires" (en français).
On peut remarquer qu'à côté de ce gaz de schiste, il existe deux autres sources potentielles de gaz « souterrain » non conventionnel, mais qui ne sont pas le sujet de cet article :
Le gaz de charbon (coal bed methane en anglais. Les couches de charbon sont riches en méthane adsorbé, que les mineurs appelaient "grisou". Des techniques récentes (voisines de celles décrites ci-dessous) permettent d'extraire ce gaz de couches de charbon trop profondes, ou trop minces et dispersées pour être exploitées par des mines classiques.
Le gaz des « réservoirs ultra-compacts » (tight gas en anglais). Il s'agit de méthane en position intermédiaire entre le gaz de schiste et le gaz conventionnel. Le gaz a pu, au cours des temps géologiques, légèrement migrer, quitter sa roche mère, mais a été piégé dans une roche très peu perméable, trop peu pour que ce gaz puisse être exploité par des méthodes classiques sur des échelles de temps "humaines" et non géologiques.
Une ressource est dite non-conventionnelle lorsque son extraction nécessite un traitement de stimulation (stimulation hydraulique, chimique, etc).
Les réserves de gaz de schiste dans le monde
http://planet-terre.ens-lyon.fr/planetterre/objets/Images/gaz-schiste/gaz-schiste-04.jpg
Lire la suite :
http://planet-terre.ens-lyon.fr/planetterre/XML/db/planetterre/metadata/LOM-gaz-schiste.xml
Une vidéo explicative des méthodes pour
l'extraction du gaz de schiste
[url]
Gaz de schiste : explications. par nonaugazschiste07[/url]
Le Royaume-Uni dit « yes » aux gaz de schiste
La levée du moratoire sur l'exploitation par fracturation hydraulique des gaz de schiste intervient au moment où Londres se dit prêt à inclure une proportion plus importante de gaz dans son mix énergétique.
Alors qu'en France le gouvernement attend une nouvelle technologie d'extraction plus écologique pour éventuellement autoriser l'exploitation des gaz de schiste, le Royaume-Uni a donné son feu vert à la seule méthode qui soit vraiment disponible, même si elle est controversée. Avec dans son viseur les bienfaits des gaz de schiste sur le prix du gaz et l'indépendance énergétique aux Etats-Unis, le ministre de l'Energie britannique Ed Davey a en effet levé ce jeudi le moratoire sur l'exploitation par fracturation hydraulique de cet hydrocarbure.
http://www.lesechos.fr/entreprises-secteurs/energie-environnement/actu/0202447996668-gaz-de-schiste-la-grande-bretagne-autorise-l-exploration-520341.php
Chine: pénurie d'eau et gaz de schiste
[Vous devez être inscrit et connecté pour voir cette image]
Depuis 2011, la Chine s'est lancée dans une ambitieuse stratégie d'extraction du gaz de schiste. Selon Pékin, les ressources exploitables du pays s'élèvent à 25.000 milliards de mètres cubes, une quantité comparable à celle des Etats-Unis.
Mais de grandes quantités d’eau sont cruciales pour l’extraction de ce gaz, laquelle peut aussi s’avérer polluante pour les nappes phréatiques. Or, comme le montre cette carte réalisée par le cabinet britannique de consultants en risque géopolitique Maplecroft, les zones les plus riches en gaz de schiste sont aussi, dans de nombreux cas, celles où les ressources en eau sont les plus rares...
Alors que la demande mondiale de gaz devrait bondir de 50% d'ici à 2035, la moitié de cette hausse sera couverte par des gaz non conventionnels, produits principalement aux États-Unis, en Australie et... en Chine, selon l'Agence internationale de l'énergie (AIE).
Lire la suite:
http://blogs.afp.com/geopolitique/?post/2012/12/07/Chine%3A-p%C3%A9nurie-d-eau-et-gaz-de-schiste
Syfou- Adminstrateur
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Localisation : Dans un autre repère !
Re: Géopolitique de gaz de schiste
par Syfou Mar 8 Jan - 21:57
The Geopolitics of Shale
According to the elite newspapers and journals of opinion, the future of foreign affairs mainly rests on ideas: the moral impetus for humanitarian intervention, the various theories governing exchange rates and debt rebalancing necessary to fix Europe, the rise of cosmopolitanism alongside the stubborn vibrancy of nationalism in East Asia and so on. In other words, the world of the future can be engineered and defined based on doctoral theses. And to a certain extent this may be true. As the 20th century showed us, ideologies -- whether communism, fascism or humanism -- matter and matter greatly.
But there is another truth: The reality of large, impersonal forces like geography and the environment that also help to determine the future of human events. Africa has historically been poor largely because of few good natural harbors and few navigable rivers from the interior to the coast. Russia is paranoid because its land mass is exposed to invasion with few natural barriers. The Persian Gulf sheikhdoms are fabulously wealthy not because of ideas but because of large energy deposits underground. You get the point. Intellectuals concentrate on what they can change, but we are helpless to change much of what happens.
Enter shale, a sedimentary rock within which natural gas can be trapped. Shale gas constitutes a new source of extractable energy for the post-industrial world. Countries that have considerable shale deposits will be better placed in the 21st century competition between states, and those without such deposits will be worse off. Ideas will matter little in this regard.
Stratfor, as it happens, has studied the issue in depth. Herein is my own analysis, influenced in part by Stratfor's research.
So let's look at who has shale and how that may change geopolitics. For the future will be heavily influenced by what lies underground.
[Vous devez être inscrit et connecté pour voir cette image]
The United States, it turns out, has vast deposits of shale gas: in Texas, Louisiana, North Dakota, Pennsylvania, Ohio, New York and elsewhere. America, regardless of many of the political choices it makes, is poised to be an energy giant of the 21st century. In particular, the Gulf Coast, centered on Texas and Louisiana, has embarked upon a shale gas and tight oil boom. That development will make the Caribbean an economic focal point of the Western Hemisphere, encouraged further by the 2014 widening of the Panama Canal. At the same time, cooperation between Texas and adjacent Mexico will intensify, as Mexico increasingly becomes a market for shale gas, with its own exploited shale basins near its northern border.
This is, in part, troubling news for Russia. Russia is currently the energy giant of Europe, exporting natural gas westward in great quantities, providing Moscow with political leverage all over Central and particularly Eastern Europe. However, Russia's reserves are often in parts of Siberia that are hard and expensive to exploit -- though Russia's extraction technology, once old, has been considerably modernized. And Russia for the moment may face relatively little competition in Europe. But what if in the future the United States were able to export shale gas to Europe at a competitive price?
The United States still has few capabilities to export shale gas to Europe. It would have to build new liquefaction facilities to do that; in other words, it would have to erect plants on the Gulf of Mexico that convert the gas into liquid so that it could be transported by ship across the Atlantic, where regasification facilities there would reconvert it back into gas. This is doable with capital investment, expertise and favorable legislation. Countries that build such facilities will have more energy options, to export or import, whatever the case may be. So imagine a future in which the United States exports liquefied shale gas to Europe, reducing the dependence that European countries have on Russian energy. The geopolitics of Europe could shift somewhat. Natural gas might become less of a political tool for Russia and more of a purely economic one (though even such a not-so-subtle shift would require significant exports of shale gas from North America to Europe).
Less dependence on Russia would allow the vision of a truly independent, culturally vibrant Central and Eastern Europe to fully prosper -- an ideal of the region's intellectuals for centuries, even as ideas in this case would have little to do with it.
This might especially be relevant to Poland. For Poland may have significant deposits of shale gas. Were Polish shale deposits to prove the largest in Europe (a very big "if"), Poland could become more of an energy producer in its own right, turning this flat country with no natural defenses to the east and west -- annihilated by both Germany and the Soviet Union in the 20th century -- into a pivot state or midlevel power in the 21st. The United States, in turn, somewhat liberated from Middle East oil because of its own energy sources (including natural gas finds), could focus on building up Poland as a friendly power, even as it loses substantial interest in Saudi Arabia. To be sure, the immense deposits of oil and natural gas in the Arabian Peninsula, Iraq and Iran will keep the Middle East a major energy exporter for decades. But the shale gas revolution will complicate the world's hydrocarbon supply and allocation, so that the Middle East may lose some of its primacy.
It turns out that Australia also has large new natural gas deposits that, with liquefaction facilities, could turn it into a principal energy exporter to East Asia, assuming Australia significantly lowers its cost of production (which may prove very hard to do). Because Australia is already starting to emerge as the most dependable military ally of the United States in the Anglosphere, the alliance of these two great energy producers of the future could further cement Western influence in Asia. The United States and Australia would divide up the world: after a fashion, of course. Indeed, if unconventional natural gas exploitation has anything to do with it, the so-called post-American world would be anything but.
The geopolitical emergence of Canada -- again, the result of natural gas and oil -- could amplify this trend. Canada has immense natural gas deposits in Alberta, which could possibly be transported by future pipelines to British Columbia, where, with liquefaction facilities, it could then be exported to East Asia. Meanwhile, eastern Canada could be the beneficiary of new shale gas deposits that reach across the border into the northeastern United States. Thus, new energy discoveries would bind the two North American countries closer, even as North America and Australia become more powerful on the world scene.
China also has significant deposits of shale gas in its interior provinces. Because Beijing is burdened by relatively few regulations, the regime could acquire the land and build the infrastructure necessary for its exploitation. This would ease somewhat China's energy crunch and aid Beijing's strategy to compensate for the decline of its coastal-oriented economic model by spurring development inland.
The countries that might conceivably suffer on account of a shale gas revolution would be landlocked, politically unstable oil producers such as Chad, Sudan and South Sudan, whose hydrocarbons could become relatively less valuable as these other energy sources come online. China, especially, might in the future lose interest in the energy deposits in such low-end, high-risk countries if shale gas became plentiful in its own interior.
In general, the coming of shale gas will magnify the importance of geography. Which countries have shale underground and which don't will help determine power relationships. And because shale gas can be transported across oceans in liquid form, states with coastlines will have the advantage. The world will be smaller because of unconventional gas extraction technology, but that only increases the preciousness of geography, rather than decreases it.
http://www.tlaxcala-int.org/article.asp?reference=8940
___
Robert D. Kaplan
According to the elite newspapers and journals of opinion, the future of foreign affairs mainly rests on ideas: the moral impetus for humanitarian intervention, the various theories governing exchange rates and debt rebalancing necessary to fix Europe, the rise of cosmopolitanism alongside the stubborn vibrancy of nationalism in East Asia and so on. In other words, the world of the future can be engineered and defined based on doctoral theses. And to a certain extent this may be true. As the 20th century showed us, ideologies -- whether communism, fascism or humanism -- matter and matter greatly.
But there is another truth: The reality of large, impersonal forces like geography and the environment that also help to determine the future of human events. Africa has historically been poor largely because of few good natural harbors and few navigable rivers from the interior to the coast. Russia is paranoid because its land mass is exposed to invasion with few natural barriers. The Persian Gulf sheikhdoms are fabulously wealthy not because of ideas but because of large energy deposits underground. You get the point. Intellectuals concentrate on what they can change, but we are helpless to change much of what happens.
Enter shale, a sedimentary rock within which natural gas can be trapped. Shale gas constitutes a new source of extractable energy for the post-industrial world. Countries that have considerable shale deposits will be better placed in the 21st century competition between states, and those without such deposits will be worse off. Ideas will matter little in this regard.
Stratfor, as it happens, has studied the issue in depth. Herein is my own analysis, influenced in part by Stratfor's research.
So let's look at who has shale and how that may change geopolitics. For the future will be heavily influenced by what lies underground.
[Vous devez être inscrit et connecté pour voir cette image]
The United States, it turns out, has vast deposits of shale gas: in Texas, Louisiana, North Dakota, Pennsylvania, Ohio, New York and elsewhere. America, regardless of many of the political choices it makes, is poised to be an energy giant of the 21st century. In particular, the Gulf Coast, centered on Texas and Louisiana, has embarked upon a shale gas and tight oil boom. That development will make the Caribbean an economic focal point of the Western Hemisphere, encouraged further by the 2014 widening of the Panama Canal. At the same time, cooperation between Texas and adjacent Mexico will intensify, as Mexico increasingly becomes a market for shale gas, with its own exploited shale basins near its northern border.
This is, in part, troubling news for Russia. Russia is currently the energy giant of Europe, exporting natural gas westward in great quantities, providing Moscow with political leverage all over Central and particularly Eastern Europe. However, Russia's reserves are often in parts of Siberia that are hard and expensive to exploit -- though Russia's extraction technology, once old, has been considerably modernized. And Russia for the moment may face relatively little competition in Europe. But what if in the future the United States were able to export shale gas to Europe at a competitive price?
The United States still has few capabilities to export shale gas to Europe. It would have to build new liquefaction facilities to do that; in other words, it would have to erect plants on the Gulf of Mexico that convert the gas into liquid so that it could be transported by ship across the Atlantic, where regasification facilities there would reconvert it back into gas. This is doable with capital investment, expertise and favorable legislation. Countries that build such facilities will have more energy options, to export or import, whatever the case may be. So imagine a future in which the United States exports liquefied shale gas to Europe, reducing the dependence that European countries have on Russian energy. The geopolitics of Europe could shift somewhat. Natural gas might become less of a political tool for Russia and more of a purely economic one (though even such a not-so-subtle shift would require significant exports of shale gas from North America to Europe).
Less dependence on Russia would allow the vision of a truly independent, culturally vibrant Central and Eastern Europe to fully prosper -- an ideal of the region's intellectuals for centuries, even as ideas in this case would have little to do with it.
This might especially be relevant to Poland. For Poland may have significant deposits of shale gas. Were Polish shale deposits to prove the largest in Europe (a very big "if"), Poland could become more of an energy producer in its own right, turning this flat country with no natural defenses to the east and west -- annihilated by both Germany and the Soviet Union in the 20th century -- into a pivot state or midlevel power in the 21st. The United States, in turn, somewhat liberated from Middle East oil because of its own energy sources (including natural gas finds), could focus on building up Poland as a friendly power, even as it loses substantial interest in Saudi Arabia. To be sure, the immense deposits of oil and natural gas in the Arabian Peninsula, Iraq and Iran will keep the Middle East a major energy exporter for decades. But the shale gas revolution will complicate the world's hydrocarbon supply and allocation, so that the Middle East may lose some of its primacy.
It turns out that Australia also has large new natural gas deposits that, with liquefaction facilities, could turn it into a principal energy exporter to East Asia, assuming Australia significantly lowers its cost of production (which may prove very hard to do). Because Australia is already starting to emerge as the most dependable military ally of the United States in the Anglosphere, the alliance of these two great energy producers of the future could further cement Western influence in Asia. The United States and Australia would divide up the world: after a fashion, of course. Indeed, if unconventional natural gas exploitation has anything to do with it, the so-called post-American world would be anything but.
The geopolitical emergence of Canada -- again, the result of natural gas and oil -- could amplify this trend. Canada has immense natural gas deposits in Alberta, which could possibly be transported by future pipelines to British Columbia, where, with liquefaction facilities, it could then be exported to East Asia. Meanwhile, eastern Canada could be the beneficiary of new shale gas deposits that reach across the border into the northeastern United States. Thus, new energy discoveries would bind the two North American countries closer, even as North America and Australia become more powerful on the world scene.
China also has significant deposits of shale gas in its interior provinces. Because Beijing is burdened by relatively few regulations, the regime could acquire the land and build the infrastructure necessary for its exploitation. This would ease somewhat China's energy crunch and aid Beijing's strategy to compensate for the decline of its coastal-oriented economic model by spurring development inland.
The countries that might conceivably suffer on account of a shale gas revolution would be landlocked, politically unstable oil producers such as Chad, Sudan and South Sudan, whose hydrocarbons could become relatively less valuable as these other energy sources come online. China, especially, might in the future lose interest in the energy deposits in such low-end, high-risk countries if shale gas became plentiful in its own interior.
In general, the coming of shale gas will magnify the importance of geography. Which countries have shale underground and which don't will help determine power relationships. And because shale gas can be transported across oceans in liquid form, states with coastlines will have the advantage. The world will be smaller because of unconventional gas extraction technology, but that only increases the preciousness of geography, rather than decreases it.
http://www.tlaxcala-int.org/article.asp?reference=8940
___
Robert D. Kaplan
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Syfou- Adminstrateur
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Re: Géopolitique de gaz de schiste
par Sphinx Mer 6 Mar - 0:04
États-Unis-Moyen-Orient : le gaz de schiste change tout !
Dans moins de 20 ans, les États-Unis, déjà autosuffisants
en matière de gaz, seront exportateurs nets de pétrole brut.
Un bouleversement stratégique.
[Vous devez être inscrit et connecté pour voir cette image]
Le gaz et le pétrole de schiste sont en passe de donner une incroyable et durable impulsion à l'économie américaine. Les dépenses d'énergie vont diminuer de moitié pour les foyers et les entreprises. Les États-Unis seront exportateurs nets de brut à l'horizon 2030. Cette nouvelle ruée vers l'or devrait générer 0,5 % de croissance au cours des cinq prochaines années et entraîner la création d'un million d'emplois. En 2035, le gaz de schiste pourrait, selon des estimations fiables, avoir produit plus de 300 milliards de dollars de richesse. Mais le phénomène risque fort de provoquer aussi une redéfinition de la politique américaine au Moyen-Orient, dont les États-Unis seront infiniment moins dépendants sur les plans gazier et pétrolier.
Le pétrole et Israël : tels sont traditionnellement les deux axes qui sous-tendent l'approche américaine entre Nil et Euphrate. Préserver les approvisionnements énergétiques demeure jusqu'à présent le souci majeur de Washington. D'où la nécessité de ménager les pays arabes, de sécuriser militairement les routes maritimes, notamment le golfe Arabo-Persique et le détroit d'Ormouz, et de périodiquement tenter de promouvoir une solution au problème palestinien tout en prenant bien soin de ne pas trop froisser l'allié israélien.
Suite sur:
http://www.lepoint.fr/monde/ou-va-le-monde-pierre-beylau/etats-unis-moyen-orient-le-gaz-de-schiste-change-tout-04-03-2013-1635778_231.php
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